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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900264-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted 
aggravated robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 and 76-4-101 (1990), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to entertain 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea when defendant 
failed to file his motion within the 30-day period mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990)? Although this issue was not 
raised below, a jurisdictional question may be entertained at any 
time during trial or on appeal. State v. Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 
298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 n.2 (1973). 
CONSTITUTIONAL. PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1990) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at 
any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest amy be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court, 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest is made by motion, and shall 
be made within 30 days after the entry of 
the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights 
of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B(i), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 29, 1987, defendant was charged with one 
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), one count of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by restricted person, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code .Ann. § 76-10-503 (1990) and as a habitual 
criminal under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 19-21). On 
February 8, 1988, defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all 
counts (R. 23). 
On March 21, 1988, defendant withdrew his plea of not 
guilty to count one and entered a plea of guilty to attempted 
aggravated robbery, a second degree felony (transcript of guilty 
plea hearing [hereinafter HTM] at 4). As part of a plea 
agreement, the State moved to dismiss the other two counts (T. 
1). The trial court accepted the plea, and defendant was 
sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison on the attempted aggravated assault charge with an 
enhancement of one year for the use of a firearm, said terms to 
be served consecutively to the sentence he was currently serving 
(T. 9, R. 29-30). 
-2-
On August 11, 1989, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he did not enter it with 
full knowledge if its consequences (R. 41). After a hearing on 
defendant's motion, the trial court denied the motion (R. 55-57). 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 27, 1990 (R. 58-
59). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this case are stated in the 
statement of the case, supra. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain 
defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea because 
defendant failed to file his motion within the 30-day period 
mandated in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
NO CONTEST PLEA BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
FILE HIS MOTION WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD 
MANDATED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1990). 
On March 21, 1988, defendant entered a guilty plea to 
the charge of attempted aggravated robbery (T. 4). At that time, 
there was no statutory time limit placed on defendant for filing 
a request to withdraw his plea. However, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6, the withdrawal of plea statute, was amended in 1989. As of 
April 24, 1989, subsection (2)(b) of that statute reads: "A 
request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the 
plea." Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on 
August 11, 1989, nearly seventeen months after the entry of the 
plea and four months after the amendment was adopted (R. 41). If 
this amendment is applied retroactively, defendant was barred 
from filing a motion to withdraw his plea, and the trial court 
had no jurisdiction to hear the motion because it was untimely 
filed. Although this issue was not raised below, a question of 
jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See Olson v. Salt Lake 
City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 n.2 (1973). 
The general rule of nonretroactivity is based upon the 
notion that 
[l]aws, whatever their form, which purport to 
make innocent acts criminal after the event, 
or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and 
oppressive, and that the criminal quality 
attributable to an act, either by the legal 
definition of the offense or by the nature or 
amount of the punishment imposed for its 
commission, should not be altered by 
legislative enactment, after the fact, to the 
disadvantage of the accused. 
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925). However, there is a 
long-standing exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity. 
[Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to 
the initiation of a suit which do not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights apply not only to future 
actions, but also to accrued and pending 
actions as well. Petty v, Clark, 113 Utah 
205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); Boucofski v. 
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909). 
State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 
(Utah 1982) (emphasis added). A procedural change was defined in 
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884): 
[A]Iterations which do not increase the 
punishment, nor change the ingredients of the 
offense or the ultimate facts necessary to 
establish guilt, . . .—leaving untouched the 
nature of the crime and the amount or degree 
of proof essential to conviction—. . . 
relate to modes of procedure only, in which 
no one can be said to have a vested right, 
and which the state, upon grounds of public 
policy, may regulate at pleasure. 
110 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added). The 30-day requirement on a 
motion to withdraw a plea contained in section 77-13-6(2)(b) has 
no substantive effect on the crime with which a defendant was 
charged. Therefore, it is procedural and can be applied 
retroactively. 
In State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of retroactivity of a statute 
in the context of an amendment to a resentencing statute. There, 
the defendant argued that since the amendment contained no 
express language indicating its retroactive effect, it could only 
be applied to crimes committed after its effective date. 
Rejecting that argument, the Court stated that the defendant had 
ignored the Court's "long-standing exception to the general rule 
of nonretroactivity. Remedial and procedural amendments apply to 
accrued, pending, and future actions." 675 P.2d at 585 (citing 
Department of Social Services v. Higgsf 656 P.2d at 1000-01). 
This Court defined the term "accrued" in Gay Hill Field 
Service v. Bd. of Review, 750 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
There, it stated that "a cause of action 'accrues at the time it 
becomes remediable in the courts.'" 750 P.2d at 609 (quoting 
State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Forkf 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 P.2d 575, 
577 (1940) (where the Utah Supreme Court further explained that a 
claim accrues "when the claim is in such a condition that the 
courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is 
established.")). Under that definition, and under the statute as 
it read at the time of defendant's plea, defendant's option to 
file a motion to withdraw his plea accrued at the time he entered 
his plea. Under the original version of the statute, defendant's 
ability to remedy his plea by filing such a motion began at the 
time of his plea and continued indefinitely. The option of 
withdrawing his plea had accrued to defendant. The amendment 
limiting the time period in which defendant could file a motion 
to withdraw his plea was procedural. Consequently, that 
procedural amendment can and should be applied to defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea. 
The amendment limiting the time in which a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea can be filed is in the nature of a statute 
of limitations. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
[T]he law is well settled that statutes 
affecting limitation may be amended and 
shortened without impinging on any 
constitutional rights of a party, provided 
always that a sufficient period of grace is 
allowed to enable a plaintiff to maintain his 
cause of action if he will follow the new 
law. . . . 
Limitation statutes . . . are but 
procedural matters and are not 
constitutionally protected if they do not 
adversely affect vested rights. 
Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
While the Vealey court spoke of a grace period to allow a 
plaintiff to maintain his cause of action, that exact proviso is 
not required in all cases. Due process concerns which dictated a 
grace period in the Vealey case have been provided for in the 
amendment to the plea withdrawal statute. The 1989 amendment to 
section 77-13-6 provides that a prisoner is not precluded from 
filing for postconviction relief under rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See § 77-13-6(3). That option is open for 
defendant. 
Because defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw 
his plea within the mandated 30-day limit, defendant was 
precluded from filing a motion to withdraw, and the trial court 
had no jurisdiction to hear the motion. Defendant is left with 
the remedy provided for in the statute. He may file a petition 
for postconviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea and affirm his conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, this /7 ^ day of March, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
S.+i.Gtki. 
JUg>ITH S. H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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